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Note
Tort Liability in Professional
Sports: Battle in the Sports Arena
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352
(D. Colo. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1812 (10th Cir.
Aug. 25, 1977).
Are American sports especially violent because they are
forced to reflect the inherent violence of our society? I
think so.
-- James A. Michener
1
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 1973, one man struck another in the back of
the head. The blow was such that
in the context of common community standards there can be no question
but that ... [it]... would generate civil liability. It would involve a crimi-
nal sanction if the requisite intent were present. The difference here
[was] that this blow was delivered on the field of play during the course of
action in a regularly scheduled professional football game.
The resultant case, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,3 has
drawn additional attention to the subject of violence in profes-
sional sports.4 However, the judicial system did not prove to be a
successful avenue of redress for Hackbart, the injured professional
football player. This note will discuss whether the court was cor-
rect in declining to declare "open season" on overzealous athletes
1. J. IcENER, SPORTS iN AMERICA 436 (1976).
2. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 358 (D. Colo. 1977), ap-
peal docketed, No. 77-1812 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 1977).
3. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1812 (10th Cir. Aug.
25, 1977).
4. See, Recent Decision, Torts-Assumption of Risk-A Professional Football
Player Assumes the Risk of Receiving a Blow, Delivered Out of Anger and
Frustration but without Specific Intent to Injure, During a Game, 12 GA. L.
REV. 380 (1978). While Hackbart involved professional football, other sports
have not been immune to violence. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1977, at 79,
for a report of the on-court incident which sent professional basketball player
Rudy Tomjanovich to the intensive-care unit of a hospital with a double frac-
ture of the jaw, a broken nose, and a concussion.
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who have injured an opponent, or whether it erected a preceden-
tial blockade for injured sports participants.
II. THE FACTS
The incident occurred during a professional football game be-
tween the Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati Bengals. Cincinnati
attempted a forward pass, during which Charles "Booby" Clark, a
fullback on the Bengals' offensive team, headed for the corner of
the north end zone as a prospective receiver. He was then within
the area of responsibility of Dale Hackbart, a free safety on the
Broncos' defensive team. The pass was intercepted by a Bronco
who began to run the ball upfield, thus reversing the offensive and
defensive roles of the teams. Hackbart attempted to block Clark
in the end zone and in so doing fell to the ground. Then, with one
knee on the ground, Hackbart watched the play continue upfield.5
In the words of the court, "[a]cting out of anger and frustration,
but without a specific intent to injure, Charles Clark stepped for-
ward and struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of the
kneeling plaintiff's head with sufficient force to cause both players
to fall foward to the ground."6 No words were exchanged and the
two players returned to their benches. No penalty was called, as
the incident was not observed by any of the officials.7 Hackbart
did not report the incident to anyone during the game, but the next
day he continued to feel pain. In the next two games he played on
specialty team assignment for the Broncos before being released
on waivers.8 Not until after the release did he seek medical ad-
vice, and it was discovered that he had suffered a neck injury.
Hackbart subsequently instituted the lawsuit.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"The aggravated assault trial of professional hockey player
Dave Forbes, in Minnesota, in July of 1975, focused public and legal
attention on the issue of violence in sports."9 Although the courts
5. 435 F. Supp. at 353.
6. Id.
7. A similar situation occurred in a 1978 Superbowl playoff game between the
Pittsburg Steelers and the Denver Broncos. Steeler defensive tackle "Mean"
Joe Greene had frequently complained to the officials that Bronco guard Paul
Howard had been repeatedly holding him on plays. Receiving little sympa-
thy from the officials, "he took matters into his own hands. Or fists. Mean
Joe leveled Howard with a devastating bolo punch to the solar plexus. Aston-
ishingly, Greene's punch escaped the eyes of only six people-the members
of Barth's [officiating] crew." SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 2, 1978, at 14.
8. 435 F. Supp. at 353-54.
9. Hallowell & Meshbesher, Sports Violence and the Criminal Law, TRiAL, Jan.
1977, at 27.
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have not completely abstained from involvement in the area of
professional sports injuries,10 their intervention has been limited.
Many of the courts which have imposed liability for injury
caused by one participant to another have done so in the area of
amateur sports. Bourque v. Duplechin" involved a softball game in
which the participants were sponsored by business establish-
ments. The plaintiff, a twenty-two year old second baseman, sued
for negligence when a member of the opposing team, running from
first to second base, deviated from the baseline to run into the
plaintiff and in so doing, brought his arm up under the plaintiff's
chin.12 The court found that the defendant "was under a duty to
play softball in the ordinary fashion without unsportsmanlike con-
duct or wanton injury to his fellow players. This duty was
breached by defendant, "whose behavior was, according to the evi-
dence, substandard and negligent."'
13
Assault and battery was the theory relied upon by another in-
jured sports participant. In Griggas v. Clauson,14 an amateur bas-
ketball player brought suit when an opponent struck him in the
head with his fist. The court, although mainly addressing whether
the damages awarded were excessive, found the jury's verdict was
supported by the weight of the testimony and affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff.'
5
A high school soccer match was the scene of another sports in-
jury in Nabozny v. Barnhill.16 During the course of the game, the
defendant, a forward, kicked the plaintiff goalkeeper's head, caus-
ing severe injuries. The plaintiff had been within the penalty area
at all times and the game was being played under organizational
rules which prohibit contact with a goalkeeper who is in the pen-
alty area and in possession of the ball.' 7 The Nabozny court set
out the following requirements for recovery for injuries suffered in
athletic contests:
[Wihen athletes are engaged in an athletic competition; all teams in-
volved are coached by knowledgeable personnel; a recognized set of rules
governs the conduct of the competition; and a safety rule is contained
10. See Averill v. Luttrell, 44 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957), in which the
court, referring to an unappealed jury verdict in the lower court, held a pro-
fessional baseball player liable for injuries to an opponent whom he had
struck with his fist.
11. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id. at 42.
14. 6 IlM App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955).
15. Id. at 418, 128 N.E.2d at 366. The court noted that "[i]f the testimony on be-
half of [plaintiff] is true, he was subjected to a wanton and unprovoked as-
sault and was struck at a time when he had his back to defendant." Id.
16. 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
17. Id. at 214, 334 N.E.2d at 260.
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therein which is primarily designed to protect players from serious injury,
a player is then charged with a legal duty to every other player on the field
to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety rule.1 8
Not all injured parties have recovered damages for incidents oc-
curring during sports participation. Courts have attempted to dis-
tinguish between injuries that are an expected part of the game
and those that would not ordinarily be anticipated to result from
engaging in athletic competition. 19 As noted by one court, "[a] cts
or omissions which may constitute negligence off the playing field
may not be such when taking place upon it."
'20
IV. THE HACKBART DECISION
The Hackbart court began its analysis by stating that "this case
must be considered in the context of football as a commercial en-
terprise."21 This would seem to be a logical starting point, since
professional football today is no longer considered "just a game."
The court noted that its commercial nature is evidenced by its or-
ganizational structure. The National Football League Players' As-
sociation is the bargaining representative of professional football
players in the National Football League (NFL). An agreement ex-
ists between the Players' Association and the National Football
League Player Relations Association, a bargaining agent for the
member clubs of the NFL. The agreement covers, among other
things, terms and conditions of employment and also provides a
procedure for resolving disputes between players and their em-
ployers. But the agreement does not provide for resolution of dis-
18. Id. at 215,334 N.E.2d at 260-61. Finding that under the facts of the case a duty
clearly arose, the court stated that
a player is liable for injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that
it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the
safety of the other players so as to cause injury to that player, the
same being a question of fact to be decided by a jury.
Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
19. See, e.g., Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966)
(baserunner sliding into fielder at base); Benedetto v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172
So. 2d 354 (La. App. 1965) (injuries sustained when bat slipped from defen-
dant's hands); McGee v. Board of Educ., 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962)
(teacher helping with baseball practice hit by a ball); Gordon v. Deer Park
School Dist. No. 414, 71 Wash. 2d 119, 426 P.2d 824 (1967) (involving injuries
sustained when bat slipped from defendant's hands). See also Thomas v.
Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927); 26 MicH. L. REv. 322 (1927-1928).
20. Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Mo. App. 1976). This court, how-
ever, did find that the petition stated a sufficient cause of action against a
shortstop in a softball game who had collided with plaintiff baserunner as she
was advancing from first to second base.
21. 435 F. Supp. at 354. See also Koppett, Sports and the Law: An Overview, 18
N.Y.L.F. 815 (1973).
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putes between players of different teams.
22
Because of its commercial nature, professional football is not
the same game it was in years past. As one note has stated,
the type of conduct that a participant can reasonably expect to occur in
some of today's professional sports markedly differs from the type of con-
duct he could have reasonably expected in the days when the participants
played for the love of the game. At that time there was not the strong moti-
vation to win that exists in professional sports today. A participant could
expect that fellow players would conduct themselves in a manner that was
in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the rules. Today, the economic
rewards or losses from winning or losing encourage players to adopt the
attitude that one must do almost anything to win.
3
There are rules which impose limitations on the ways in which
an NFL player may make contact with opposing players. But as
noted by the Hackbart court, "because of the speed and violence
of the game, their application is often a matter of subjective evalu-
ation of the circumstances. '24 The court referred to the common
occurrence of disabling injuries in this type of athletic event and
noted that "[p ]rofessional football players are conditioned to 'play
with pain' and.., are expected to perform even though they are
hurt."2
Football as a commercial enterprise and the violent nature of
the game are important considerations when analyzing a case such
as Hackbart. However, the court's decision seemed to overempha-
size these aspects, and minimized the real issue, that one person
suffered injury at the hand of another.
A. Is There a Duty Owed?
The plaintiff sought to impose liability upon the defendant on
22. 435 F. Supp. at 354.
23. Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L REv. 148, 159
n.39 (1976). The attitude in amateur sports may not be all that different, es-
pecially in college sports where scholarships may be at stake. Even where
economic rewards are not present, other types of motivations may contribute
to an attitude that one must do anything in order to win, both during training
sessions and on the field. See generally J. MICHENER, supra note 1, at 421-22,
433-35.
24. 435 F. Supp. at 354. The court further stated:
During 1973, the rules were enforced by six officials on the playing
field. The primary sanction for a violation was territorial with the
amounts of yardage lost being dependent upon the particular infrac-
tion. Players were also subject to expulsion from the game and to
monetary penalties imposed by the league commissioner.
Id. However, fines and penalties have not proved an effective solution to the
elimination of violence in sports. Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the
Prosecution, TmAi, Jan. 1977, at 33.
25. 435 F. Supp. at 355.
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theories of reckless misconduct 2 6 and negligence. A theory of in-
tentional misconduct was barred by the statute of limitations.
27
Both of plaintiff's theories, according to the court, depended upon
whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. "Thus, the
question is what would a reasonably prudent professional football
player be expected to do under the circumstances confronting
Charles Clark in this incident?" 2 8 Although former players testi-
fied that such conduct "could not be considered customary or ac-
ceptable,"29 the court placed emphasis on the fact that players are
not trained to regard the safety of opposing players. 30 It is ques-
tionable whether the court was correct when it stated that "[i]t is
wholly incongruous to talk about a professional football player's
duty of care for the safety of opposing players when he has been
trained and motivated to be heedless of injury to himself."
31
Some courts have recognized that a participant in a sports
event owes a minimum duty to the other participants.32 However,
these courts were not dealing with the subject of professional ath-
letics. As the Hackbart court noted, the differences between high
school, college and professional games "are largely reflective of the
fact that at each level the players have increased physical abilities,
improved skills and differing motivations. '33 It would seem to fol-
low that an athlete's ability to cause a more serious injury also in-
creases. Thus, to say that a professional football player owes no
duty to his opponents is to give him "free rein" every time he steps
on the playing field.3 The Hackbart court seemed to encourage
this result when it stated that "[t] he character of NFL competition
negates any notion that the playing conduct can be circumscribed
by any standard of reasonableness.
'35
B. The Defenses.
According to the Hackbart court, the plaintiff's theories of lia-
bility were subject to the defenses of consent 36 and assumption of
26. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
27. Thus, the Hackbart decision may not be applicable in other than a negligence
situation.
28. 435 F. Supp. at 355.
29. Id. at 356.
30. Id. at 355-56.
31. Id. at 356.
32. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 11. App. 3d 212,334 N.E.2d 258 (1975); Bour-
que v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
33. 435 F. Supp. at 354. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
34. Although players are limited to some extent by penalties and fines, this does
little to compensate the injured party.
35. 435 F. Supp. at 356.
36. The defense of consent is usually associated with intentional torts rather
than negligence.
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risk. Defining the scope of actual consent in the sports setting
presents some difficulties in that "[t] he number of objective indi-
cations available to evaluate the mental state of the participant in
this context is limited."3 7 Participation in the game is seen as im-
plying consent.38 However, it has also been said that "[tihe de-
fendant's privilege is limited to the conduct to which the plaintiff
consents, or at least to acts of a substantially similar nature.
'39
The question remains whether defendant Clark's conduct was
within the realm of that consented to by Hackbart when he en-
tered the game. A football player does consent to being tackled
and to other contacts that are an inevitable part of the game. But
even so, it would seem that Hackbart would not reasonably expect
to experience forcible contact when the action on his end of the
field had ceased. Thus, had the play already been called dead, a
finding that Hackbart consented to the conduct might have been
less certain.
It has been suggested that the scope of consent should be de-
fined according to the rules of the game.4o One commentator has
stated: "[t]hus, because '[o]ne who enters into a sport, game or
contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent
with the understood rules of the game,' aggravated fighting in the
athletic arena would appear to be without the aid of the defense
under traditional rules.' 41 Commentators advocating criminal
sanctions42 as a solution to violence in professional sports note
that
37. Note, supra note 23, at 156.
38. Id.
39. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 103 (4th ed. 1971).
40. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975). RESTATE-
mrr (SEcorm) OF TORTS § 50, Comment b (1965) provides:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bod-
ily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or
usages. Participating in such a game does not manifest consent to
contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such
rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not
merely to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill.
This is true although the player knows that those with or against
whom he is playing are habitual violators of the rule.
41. Comment, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 771, 775 n.27
(quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 39).
42. The possibility of imposing criminal sanctions is a relevant inquiry since
[i]n both the criminal and tort setting, the factfinder must look at all
the evidence to determine whether the victim in fact consented....
Since the issue of the party's subjective state of mind is the same, the
resolution of problems concerning actual consent that arise in the
civil context applies equally to those problems that arise in a crimi-
nal trial.
Note, supra note 23, at 150 n.12.
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[w]hether the defense of consent then may be raised successfully should
be dependent on whether the injuries were occasioned through an acci-
dent while the actor was in compliance with the rules of the game or
whether the injuries were inflicted under such circumstances that they
tend to show a definite resolve on the part of the actor to cause'a serious
injury to another.
4 3
It has also been suggested that perhaps the "rules of the game"
approach is too narrow.44 The following alternative has been pro-
posed:
Any player's conduct that is not consistent with society's notions of how
the game should be played should not be considered "part of the game."
Thus, this concept can serve as a standard for defining the scope of a par-
ticipant's consent: An athlete consents only to that conduct which is a
part of the game
4 5
This alternative has its limitations but the advantage "is that it fo-
cuses on the controlling consideration-the extent to which society
will tolerate injury-causing activity in the sports context."
46
The Hackbart court accepted Clark's conduct as a part of the
game when it stated that "[t] he record ... reflects that what he
did is, unfortunately an example of the excesses of violence which
have become expectable as a result of the style of play in the
NFL."47 Even if such conduct is expectable, it does not necessar-
ily follow that it should be tolerable, nor can it be said that consent
to such conduct exists in every case. However, the defense of con-
sent has met with success. As one commentator hypothesizes:
"One possible reason why consent has been deemed effective
more frequently in sports than in other contexts is that athletic
events have beneficial aspects that justify society's toleration of
certain injuries."48 The Hackbart court conceded that even had a
duty existed, there could be no recovery for the plaintiff because of
the defense of assumption of risk.49 The court explained:
[Tihe lvel of violence and the frequency of emotional outbursts in NFL
football games are such that Dale Hackbart must have recognized and ac-
43. Flakne & Caplan, supra note 24, at 35.
44. One of the reasons suggested is that some infractions which occur frequently
do not seem serious to the players. "It may not be improper to consider such
violations as part of the game; thus, a player may be deemed to have con-
sented to such actions although a rule designed to protect the players has
been violated." Note, supra note 23, at 158.
45. Id. at 160.
46. Id. at 161.
47. 435 F. Supp. at 357.
48. Note, supra note 23, at 173-74.
49. It has been stated that
[w]ith respect to injuries caused by the intentional conduct of
others, it seems proper to speak in terms of consent- with respect to
injuries caused by the unintentional or inadvertent conduct of
others, it seems proper to speak in terms of assumption of risk.
Id. at 156 n.30.
1135
1136 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 4 (1978)
cepted the risk that he would be injured by such an act as that committed
by the defendant Clark on September 16, 1973. Accordingly, the plaintiff
must be held to have assumed the risk of such an occurrence.
50
It is not argued that assumption of risk should never be applied in
the context of professional sports. As stated in Bourque v.
Duplechin:
A participant in a game or sport assumes all of the risks incidental to that
particular activity which are obvious and forseeable. A participant does
not assume the risk of injury from fellow players acting in an unexpected
or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of concern for others partici-
pating.
The risk of an opponent's negligence may be assumed "when the
player knows the dangerous act is taking place and he voluntarily
exposes himself to the risk."52 But it is questionable whether a
professional athlete's consent is really voluntary. The athlete may
be opposed to the violence present in his sport, but participate in
order to earn his living.53 The Hackbart court stated: "Like coal
mining and railroading, professional football is hazardous to the
health and welfare of those who are employed as players."' ' How-
ever, certainly there are risks in their jobs that even coalminers
and railroad employees do not assume.
Athletic injuries illustrate that "overly simplified rules relating
to assumption of risk cannot be applied automatically in this type
of litigation."5 5 It must first be recognized that certain injuries are
inevitable in a sports contest. Then the facts of each case must be
carefully investigated before automatically rejecting the claim of
an injured participant as an assumed risk.56
In rendering its decision, the Hackbart court noted certain
facts. Hackbart did return to play in the second half of the game
after his injury and did not report the incident to his coaches dur-
ing the game.5 7 It was not until after Hackbart lost his employ-
ment that he sought medical assistance.5 8 However, the rationale
behind the court's decision seems to be its reluctance to become
involved in what it believes "a task for which the courts are not
50. 435 F. Supp. at 356.
51. 331 So. 2d 40, 42 (La. App. 1976) (citations omitted).
52. Recent Cases, Torts-Participant in Athletic Competition States Cause of Ac-
tion for Injuries Against Other Participant, 42 Mo. L. REv. 347, 354 (1977).
53. Note, supra note 23, at 159 n.39.
54. 435 F. Supp. at 357.
55. Hofeld, Athletes-Their Rights and Correlative Duties, 1975 TIAL LAw. GUIDE
383, 400.
56. Id. at 401.
57. 435 F. Supp. at 353. As noted by the court, "this incident was clearly shown
on the Denver Broncos' defensive game films, which were routinely reviewed
by the defensive players and coaching staff, [and] none of them made it a
matter of special attention or concern." Id. at 356.
58. 435 F. Supp. at 354.
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well suited."5 9
V. SHOULD THE COURTS BECOME INVOLVED?
After making its decision on the particular facts of the case, the
Hackbart court further noted that the case "raises the larger ques-
tion of whether playing field action in the business of professional
football should become a subject for the business of the courts."
60
It is believed that society benefits when individuals participate in
sports or act as observers. 61 It is said that sports also contribute to
the development of a person's self-image.62 However, violence in
American sports may also reflect the violence in our society.
63
Because violence is an inherent factor in many sports, legal in-
tervention is difficult.6 4 Part of the problem is "the widespread
feeling that sports comprise a unique institution that cannot be le-
gally ordered without grave damage to the institution itself."
65
Not every injured athlete should have a cause of action. However,
"our society never intended to excuse unjustified brutality merely
because it occurs on a playing field."66 Although speaking about
high school athletics, the court in Nabozny v. Barnhill67 explained
"that the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free
and vigorous participation in sports by our youth. However, we
also believe that organized competition does not exist in a vacuum.
Rather some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every
athlete onto the playing field. ' 68 Professional sports do not exist
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id. at 357.
61. Note, supra note 23, at 174.
62. Slusher, Sport A Philosophical Perspective, 38 L & CONTEMP. PROB. 129
(1973).
63. J. icmNER, supra note 1, at 436. Mlichener states:
Within recent years the new frontier created by urban disruption has
produced shocking levels of violence. I have just seen a report which
states that in American schools last year there were 204,000 instances
in which students beat up their teachers in the classroom, 9,000 cases
of rape in washrooms, and about 100 murders during school hours.
Such conduct is incredible, and there had better be a retreat from
this dangerous addiction. One place to start would be sports, both in
the way they are played and in the behavior of spectators. Ice hock-
ey and football have become too violent, and they set a deplorable
example for other sports.
Id. And as noted by the Hackbart court, part of the attraction for some per-
sons to the game of football is the "spectacle of savagery." 435 F. Supp. at
355.
64. Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 9, at 27.
65. Id. at 28.
66. Hofeld, supra note 55, at 405.
67. 31 IMl. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
68. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260.
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in a vacuum either, but the Hackbart court came to the opposite
conclusion stating that "[tihere are no Athenian virtues in this
form of athletics. The NFL has substituted the morality of the bat-
tlefield for that of the playing field, and the 'restraints of civiliza-
tion' have been left on the sidelines.
'69
"[Pjrofessional football has been a self-regulated industry.
'70
But this self-regulation may not be adequate to protect profes-
sional athletes.7 1 "It is by no means certain... that private orga-
nizations themselves are capable of adequately protecting societal
interests without judicial or other government involvement."
72 Ju-
dicial intervention into the area of sports can be based on the "rec-
ognition that the sports establishment is often unable, or
unwilling, to provide justice to players injured by adversaries play-
ing outside the rules of the game.'
73
There are problems with the judicial system becoming involved
in professional sports. The concerns of the Hackbart court were
the difficulty of the application of the NFL rules of play, the prob-
lem of causation in light of the frequency of forceful collisions, the
enormous amount of litigation that would result, and the likelihood
that the courts would develop differing and conflicting principles
of law.7 4 In balancing all the factors, it would seem that the pres-
ent system of internal control in sports no longer provides a worka-
ble or adequate solution to the problem of the injured sports
participant. It has been suggested that federal and state sports
commissions be created and given primary review of sports-re-
lated matters, with only extreme cases being referred to the judi-
69. 435 F. Supp. at 358. This seems to be borne out by the testimony of John
Ralston, the 1973 Broncos coach:
[T]he pre-game psychological preparation should be designed to
generate an emotion equivalent to that which would be experienced
by a father whose family had been endangered by another driver
who had attempted to force the family car off the edge of a mountain
road. The precise pitch of motivation for the players at the begin-
ning of the game should be the feeling of that father when, after over-
taking and stopping the offending vehicle, he is about to open the
door to take revenge upon the person of the other driver.
Id. at 355.
70. Id. at 357.
71. See Comment, supra note 41, at 784-89.
72. Note, supra note 23, at 175.
73. Sports, Torts, Courts, TkLAL, Jan. 1977, at 21. While there do not seem to be
statistics correlating the number of injuries occurring in football to the viola-
tions of safety rules, there are startling numbers of injuries occurring in each
game, some of which are the result of violations of the rules. Between 1969
and 1974, there were an estimated 5110 NFL player injuries. And in the 1973-
1974 season, the estimated cost to the NFL's 26 teams in salaries and other
compensation amounted to $17,600,000. Hofeld, supra note 55, at 401-02.
74. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
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cial system.7 5 This would be worth investigating as a type of
intermediary ground. However, the judicial system should not be
overlooked as a viable alternative. In any event, a solution must
be developed because the professional athlete injured today by
conduct outside the scope of the game will be without recourse if
courts follow the example of Hackbart and place undue emphasis
on the idea of sports as an institution rather than on the injury
itself.
Patricia K. Schuett '79
75. Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 9, at 32.
1139
